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Firm Size and Monetary Policy 




A b stra ct
Using business survey data oil German manufacturing firms, 
this paper provides tests for hypotheses formulated in capital mar­
ket imperfection theories that predict distributional effects in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the business conditions of firms of several size 
classes are analysed, with the finding of considerable asymmetry. 
As predicted by theory, small firms are affected more strongly 
than large firms. To test whether these effects are reinforced when 
the economy is in a business cycle downturn, the paper employs 
a new estimation strategy: impulse response analysis conditional 
on Markov-switching regimes. The findings are supportive o f the 
theoretical hypotheses: in a business cycle downturn, the distri­
butional effects o f monetary policy transmission are indeed rein­
forced: JEL: E52, E44, C32.
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Frank Smets and Philip Vermeulen for helpful discussions, an anonymous referee and 
seminar participants at the Deutsche Bundesbank for comments and Anders Warne 






















































































































































































Numerous recent publications have been devoted to a theoretical anal­
ysis of the various channels of monetary policy transmission.1 On the 
empirical side, the evidence is still far from complete. This paper aims 
to contribute further evidence on two channels of monetary policy trans­
mission, namely the balance sheet and the credit channel.
The balance sheet channel is built on the argument that asymmet­
ric information in the credit markets necessitates the use of collateral for 
borrowing. As a consequence, the availability of credit for firms is depen­
dent on the value of their assets. If credit market conditions tighten by 
rising interest rates, this will affect the balance sheet positions of firms: 
higher interest payments reduce cash flow and higher interest rates lower 
the market value of assets. A monetary policy tightening can thus pos­
sibly lead to a restricted access to credit for firms. The firms which are 
more likely to be affected by this channel are small firms: due to higher 
informational asymmetries, the amount of collateral they have to pledge 
is relatively higher. Additionally, being small means that they do not 
dispose of as many collateralisable assets as large firms do. A balance 
sheet weakening due to monetary policy tightening can thus considerably 
diminish the collateral value they have at their disposal, and they might 
become credit-constrained. Large firms are less affected by this channel, 
given their overall higher level of collateralisable assets and the lower 
collateral requirements on their loans.
The credit channel also creates a disproportionate effect of tighter 
monetary conditions on firms of different sizes. To trigger off the credit 
channel it is necessary that the central bank have a leverage over the 
volume of intermediated credit in the economy. Then, a tighter mone­
tary policy decreases the volume of credit available to borrowers. The 
distributional effect comes about because some firms are relatively more 
dependent on intermediated credit than others. Typically, it is easier for 
large firms to access other, non-intermediated forms of external finance, 
because the markets possess more information about these firms. Small



























































































firms, on the other hand, have to rely on intermediated credit to over­
come their informational disadvantage. Following a monetary tightening, 
it is therefore relatively easy for large firms to substitute intermediated 
credit with other funds, whereas small firms are less flexible and hence 
face a restricted availability of funds.2
Both channels of monetary policy transmission are reflected in the­
ories of credit market imperfections like those of Bcrnanke and Gertler 
(1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Several recent publications (e.g., 
Christiano et al. (1996) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)) have provided 
supportive evidence for the US economy: using firm size as a proxy for 
capital market access,3 they do indeed find that small firms are affected 
more strongly by changes in monetary policy stance.
The strength of both transmission channels depends on the phase of 
the business cycle: theory predicts that both are stronger in a downturn. 
The balance sheet channel becomes more potent because net worth of 
firms falls in downturns, with a corresponding deterioration of balance 
sheet positions: the credit channel is strengthened because in a downturn 
default probabilities rise, thus increasing the cost of intermediated credit 
and starting a flight to quality, which restricts small firms even more 
than in other business cycle phases.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that, indeed, small firms' reac­
tions to shocks to the Federal Funds Rate are dependent on the business 
cycle position. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (PQT - 2000) employ a 
Markov-switching framework to examine the effects of interest rate in­
creases and liquidity squeezes on stock returns for size-sorted portfolios; 
they confirm, firstly, that small firms are affected more strongly by tight­
ening monetary conditions and, secondly, that these effects are reinforced 
if the economy is in a recession.
- Anot her lino of argument is that small firms on average have a higher growth rate 
(which is in contrast to Gibrat’s law, but often found empirically, as e.g. by Evans, 
1987), thereby creating higher capital requirements, and a stronger vulnerability to 
the credit channel.
3 Watson (1999) shows that the size of a firm is a good proxy for its capital market 




























































































To date, all time series evidence has been exclusively concerned with 
the US economy. So far, no time series study on European economies has 
been performed, for a straightforward reason: time series data on small 
firms are extremely difficult to find for European economies. Stock re­
turns as in PQT (2000) are not an option because in European economies, 
until recently, small firms typically were not traded on any exchange. 
Quarterly Financial Reports as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) are pub­
lished for some countries, but generally do not span a sufficiently long 
time period to start an econometric analysis. Annual balance sheet data, 
which are available for small firms, do not allow inference at higher fre­
quencies. Research on European economies has therefore exclusively em­
ployed panel data sets, normally confirming that firm size matters.4 The 
use of panel data sets is not without drawbacks, however, because most 
of them are criticised for being biased towards large firms.
The present paper is therefore the first to provide time series evi­
dence for a European economy. It uses a data set for Germany that is 
not subject to the shortcomings mentioned; it includes very small firms 
(1-49 employees), is available at a monthly frequency and goes back far 
enough to permit time series inference. The data set will be described 
in section 2 of this paper. Section 3 explores whether small firms are 
affected disproportionately by monetary tightenings, and to what extent 
firms’ exchange rate sensitivity varies across size classes. Section 4 tries 
to identify whether the asymmetry arises due to demand or supply side 
factors. In a further step, section 5 checks for business cycle asymme­
tries of monetary policy effects. Eventually, section 6 deals with the 
expectation formation of firms in order to see whether they mirror the 
distributional effects of monetary policy. Section 7 concludes.
4Rondi et al. (1998), or Watson (1999), using annual balance sheet data, find 
evidence that small and large firms react differently to monetary tightenings. For a 





























































































Each month, the German ifo-Institute for Economic Research conducts 
a business survey among more than 8,000 firms. Of these, approximately 
3,000 belong to the West German manufacturing industry and form the 
subsample used in this paper. I will use the answers to three of the ques­
tions, namely, on the business conditions of firms, the demand situation 
and the expectations of business conditions. Firms are invited to answer 
these questions in the following ways:
• “At present, we consider our business conditions to be i) good, ii) 
satisfactory (usual for the season), iii) bad"
• “Our demand situation, compared to the last month, has i) im­
proved, ii) remained unchanged, iii) deteriorated”
• “With regard to the business cycle, our business conditions will, 
over the next 6 months, i) rather improve, ii) stay approximately 
the same, iii) rather deteriorate” 5
Boxes are provided next to each answer; the firms have to tick the 
box according to their choice. That the questions on business conditions 
and expectations are put in a very general way, without restricting the 
potential set of criteria that can influence the answer, is intentional. The 
idea behind this is that firms themselves can best decide which factors 
are decisive for their terms of business. For each question, all answers are 
aggregated to an index variable by subtracting the share of “- ’’ answers 
(third option) from the share of “+ ” answers (first option). The indices 
can therefore take any value between +1 and -1. with the extreme cases 
occurring when all firms answer with “+ ” or .
The data can be broken down according to firm size, with the fol­
lowing classifications:
5The German original is ' 'Unsere Geschaftslage wird in den nachsten 6 Monaten 





























































































Size Class 1 2 3 4 5
Employees 1-49 50-199 200-499 500-999 >1,000
% of sample 16% 33% 23% 13% 15%
Although the ifo-Institute’s business survey started in 1949, this 
type of disaggregation can be traced back until July 1981 only. The latest 
observation included in the analysis here is 1998:12. As an illustration, 
figures 1 and 2 show the business conditions and the business expectations 
for the largest and smallest firms. It can be easily seen that the series 
vary considerably across firm size.
Tables 1 and 2 give a brief first analysis of the series. Interest­
ingly, all the descriptive statistics (i.e., mean and coefficient of variation) 
exhibit a monotonic relationship between the size classes, for both the 
business conditions and expectations. This monotonicity will reappear 
in several results throughout the paper and suggests that size is an im­
portant factor in explaining firm behaviour.
Size Class 1 (smallest) 2 3 4 5 (largest)
Business Conditions -.118 -.064 -.048 -.020 -.006
Business Expectations -.279 -.163 -.053 -.047 -.002
Table 1: Mean of Series
Size Class 1 (smallest) 2 3 4 5 (largest)
Business Conditions -141 -323 -425 -1095 -3917
Business Expectations -98 -182 -536 -560 -15250
Table 2: Coefficient of Variation of Series
The questions on the current conditions of business and the ex­
pectations for the next six months form the basis for the “i/o business 
climate index", an indicator which is widely used in German business cy­




























































































is shown in table 3 in the appendix, the correlations of the data with the 
business cycle is striking and clearly shows a leading pattern. Business 
conditions lead deviations from trend in industrial production by one 
quarter, and have a correlation coefficient of 0.85 for most size classes. 
The business expectations lead by even more, namely by two quarters, 
and also show a high correlation with the actual output figures. For a 
graphical analysis see figures 3 and 4.6
A priori, it is not clear whether data series of this kind actually 
allow for an analysis of macroeconomic issues. Firstly, it can be argued 
that the access to relevant information differs across size classes, thus 
leading to different response patterns. Secondly, the series do not report 
“hard” and quantifiable facts of the firms’ situation, but instead only 
contain the perceptions of firms. Nothing guarantees that the perceptions 
of firms are, even when aggregated, on average correct. That the mean of 
the series differs across size classes could give an indication on this issue - 
it is possible that small firms are consistently overpessimistic, leading to 
a lower mean than for large firms. If this were the case, the data analysis 
could be easily rescued by demeaning the series. The issue would become 
more problematic if a perception bias varied over the business cycle. In 
this case evidence on business cycle asymmetries would become spurious. 
However, there is evidence that the data are free of such biases. The high 
correlation of all series with the business cycle, and especially the fact 
that these correlations are not significantly different across size classes 
suggests that the series draw a rather accurate picture of actual business 
conditions. I am therefore confident in assuming that the business survey 
data can give evidence about the effects of monetary policy on firms and 
do not restrict the analysis to one of the perception of firms.7
Since I intend to draw inferences about the size effects of monetary 
policy, it is necessary to check whether the data can give unbiased infor­
6Figures 3 and 1 show the bandpassed quarterly series of industrial production, 
business conditions and business expectations. The filter uses only the business cycle 
frequencies (6 - 32 quarters) of the data and removes higher frequencies like seasonality 
and lower frequencies like trends. For a reference, see King and Watson (1996).
‘ For other recent papers which use the same kind of data successfully see Buckle 




























































































mation on this. If it were the case that some size class were dominated 
by a certain industry, inferences drawn from the data set would actu­
ally not report size effects but rather industry effects of monetary policy. 
However, looking at the industry breakdown of the data set it becomes 
clear that no such bias is present. Manufacturing industry comprises 
27 subsectors according to the ifo-Institute’s classification scheme. Even 
though most industries cover all size classes, this is not the case for all of 
them. Exceptions are the wood industry, which comprises size classes 1 
to 3 only, car manufacturing (size classes 2 to 5 only), ceramics (1 to 4), 
paper (1 to 4), “other production goods” (3 to 5), and “other consumer 
goods” (1 to 3). This makes 6 out of 27 industries, most of which (with 
the exception of car manufacturing) have a relatively small share in the 
aggregate industrial production. I therefore regard any possible biases as 
negligible; the results obtained with the business survey data set reflect 
size class differences rather than industry characteristics.
The other variables used in this paper are German producer price 
inflation, the growth rate of M3, the change in the logarithm of the ex­
change rate against the US dollar, industrial production and a three 
months' money market rate, all taken from Datastream. The busi­
ness survey series are transformed according to y* — In a rnono-
tonically increasing transformation that maps the data from the [-1,1]- 
interval to the [-oo,-t-oo]-interval; a more detailed explanation is provided 
in appendix A .l. All other variables, with the exception of interest rates, 
arc in logarithms (the growth rates are annualised differences of the vari­
ables in logarithms).
3 Monetary Policy and Business Conditions
In order to analyse the effects which monetary policy can have on firms 
of different sizes, I employ Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs). 
In particular, I am going to use the identification approach suggested by 
King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (KPSW - 1991). SVAR models investi­




























































































policy analysis is performed by looking at the responses of output and 
inflation to a shock in the interest rate or a monetary aggregate. The 
KPSW framework allows for a more complex set-up - here, monetary 
policy analysis can be modelled in terms of shocks to the cointegration 
relations, and as such is not restricted to shocks to single variables. As 
a matter of fact, a monetary policy shock will be modelled as a shock to 
the interest rate and a shock (with opposite sign) to the money growth 
rate. A more detailed discussion of both SVAR models and the KPSW 
procedure is provided in appendix A.2.
The estimations start with a very simple baseline model, simply to 
ensure that monetary policy effects are properly identified. In order to 
investigate the differential impact of monetary policy actions on firms of 
different size, the model will subsequently be extended.
3.1 The Baseline Model
The baseline model consists of a four-variate VAR with =  [Z?m( ipt i, nt]/ , 
where X t denotes a vector including the growth rate of M3 (Dmt), in­
dustrial production (ipt), the short-term interest rate (it) and producer 
price inflation (7r().8 The data are monthly and range from 1981:7 to 
1998:12, covering a sample of 210 observations. Since the aim of this pa­
per is to identify effects over the business cycle, seasonality and long-run 
trends are eliminated by the inclusion of seasonal dummies and the use 
of detrended variables. The latter is achieved by simply regressing the 
data on a linear trend. Six lags are included in the models, which are 
estimated as Vector Error Correction models (VECMs) to allow for the
8The choice of producer price inflation as the inflation measure has been made 
because producer prices, unlike consumer prices, are not affected by indirect tax 
increases. Tire consumer price index (CPI) for Germany was subject to big jumps 
eacli time indirect taxes were increased. These jumps were especially severe after 
German unification, when the tax increases were particularly large and, additionally, 
the liberalisation of East German rents in two rounds fed into the CPI. After correcting 
for these effects producer and consumer price inflation show a very similar pattern.






























































































As a matter of fact, the cointegration analysis for this baseline 
model suggests the existence of cointegration relations (see table 4). 
Three possible cointegration relations come to mind: deviations of out­
put from trend should be stationary, because they form a business cycle 
indicator and as such should be mean reverting; economic theory suggests 
furthermore that real interest rates are stationary. The third cointegrat­
ing vector assumes that in the long run, money growth (possibly money 
growth exceeding some constant rate) equals inflation, which imposes 
superneutrality of money.9 A cointegration rank of three seems plausible 
a priori, and the test statistics can be read in this way. In the following 
the existence of three cointegration relations is therefore assumed.
The cointegrating vectors can be formulated as follows:
D m t iPi it 7T(
: 0 1 0 0
: 0 0 1 -1
: 1 0 0 -1
a hypothesis which cannot be rejected in a corresponding test, as shown 
in table 5 in the appendix.10 With this specification of the cointegrating 
vectors and the cointegration rank set to r =  3, I can now proceed with 
the impulse response analysis of the system. The monetary policy shock 
is expected to be transitory, because after some time all four variables
9This is derived and shown to be empirically relevant in Crowder (1997): He 
assumes an aggregate supply function of the form Ayt -  A y {  =  7(Apf+1 — Ap(+i), 
where Aijt is growth of real output, and Ay {  denotes real output growth at full 
employment, and money demand m< — pt =  f (y t,...). The equilibrium relationships 
are Ay, =  A y / and money demand being equal to money supply. In steady state it 
therefore has to be the case that Am, =  Apf =  Ap,. The underlying assumption of 
a stable money demand (with unit income elasticity) has found considerable support 
for the German ctise; for a recent example see Hubrich, K. (1999).
10In one ctise, the p-value of the test on the cointegration relations is on the border­
line with 0.03. In small samples, there is a bias towards overrejection of the null, as 
shown by Podivinskv (1992). This and the fact that the p-values for the other models 




























































































should return to baseline (N.B. that this already implies an identifica­
tion restriction).11 Hence it is sufficient for my purposes to identify the 
subsystem of transitory shocks only. To do so, additional r(r — l) /2  =  3 
identification restrictions must be imposed. Regarding the monetary pol­
icy shock, the specification chosen here is fairly standard in assuming that 
monetary policy can affect neither output nor inflation within the same 
month.
The resulting impulse responses are provided in the first four graphs 
of figure 5 in the appendix. All responses are presented with ±cr-error 
bounds. The monetary policy shock is found to be a combination of 
a shock to the money growth rate and to interest rates: a decrease in 
money growth plus an increase in interest rates constitute a contrac­
tionary monetary policy shock. This shock is followed by a decrease in 
both inflation and industrial production. All impulse responses are as 
expected a priori, which indicates that the baseline model has succeeded 
in identifying monetary policy innovations.12
3.2 Monetary Policy Transmission to Business Con­
ditions
After having identified monetary policy shocks in the baseline model, 
the effects on the business conditions for firms of different size are in­
vestigated. The estimation strategy followed is to substitute one of the
11 Actually, the persistent shock is a nominal shock, too - it affects the nonstationary 
variables in the VAR, i.e. permanently alters the levels of inflation, money growth 
and/or interest rates. The interpretation of such a shock could be one of a changing 
inflation target of the Bundesbank. However, such a shock is difficult to reconcile 
with the actual pattern of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy; I consider it more 
reasonable to assume that the nonstationarity of the series is a matter of the sample 
size rather than one of actual properties of the time series - over the short sample, 
the series appear to be integrated. This means that the series have to be modelled 
as nonstationary for econometric reasons, but that the nonstationarity of the series 
is more a statistical rather than an economically interpretable property.
12 All the results in this paper are surprisingly robust. Even changes in the variables, 




























































































business conditions variables (6c*t) for business cycle variable “devia­
tions of industrial production from trend” (ipt), each in turn. That is, 
the model is re-estimated five times, with Dmt, it and nt unchanged, 
and the business cycle variable varying from “Business conditions for 
size class 1 (smallest)” to “Business conditions for size class 5 (largest)” . 
Again, the cointegration analysis suggests three cointegrating vectors, 
and the hypotheses on the cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected (see 
tables 4 and 5).
The corresponding impulse responses are plotted in the second and 
third rows of figure 5 in the appendix. Not surprisingly, the business 
conditions for all firms worsen after a tightening of monetary policy. The 
pattern of responses is very similar to that of the deviations of industrial 
production from trend, mirroring the close correlation of the variables. 
This exercise is interesting in so far as we now know that a monetary 
tightening affects firms of all size classes negatively. However, it is not 
yet possible to draw any conclusions about the asymmetric impacts a 
monetary tightening might have on firms of different size. Thus, an 
extended model is called for.
3.3 Asymmetric Effects of a Monetary Tightening 
Across Size Classes
In order to test for possible asymmetries the SVAR models are extended. 
Namely, the difference of responses of firms is included as an additional 
variable. To give an example, the business conditions of the largest firms 
arc subtracted from those of the smallest firms (A i5,t =  6ci.( — 6cs,(). If 
both business conditions react in a parallel way to interest rate shocks, 
no significant response of the additional variable should be detectable. 
If small firms are hit harder by rising interest rates, then Ay,t should 
become negative. The interpretation of such a finding would be that rel­
atively more small than large firms answer that their business conditions 
have deteriorated, and thus that more small firms feel the effects of a 
tightening.




























































































monetary policy shock and those to an exchange rate shock are disen­
tangled properly. A priori, it is often believed that large firms are much 
more export-oriented than small firms. The behaviour of the raw data 
series in figure 1 is consistent with this belief. It is a well-established 
pattern that the German business cycle is strongly dependent on the 
export performance of firms. A higher export propensity could thus 
explain the higher variance of large firms’ business conditions over the 
cycle. The ERM exchange rate crisis of 1992/93 can serve as an event 
study. During 1992/93, many ERM currencies devalued against the DM. 
Export-oriented firms consequently had to face a strong deterioration in 
business conditions - and indeed, the business conditions of large firms 
plummeted relative to those of small firms.
If firm sizes differ with respect to their export orientation, it is 
important to disentangle the exchange rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission from the balance sheet and credit channels. It is therefore 
crucial to include the exchange rate in the VAR models.
The extended VAR spans X t — [AtJ( Dexrt Dmt ipt it r t\'. 
The new variables arc both stationary (Note that the exchange rate enters 
in first differences;13 X lJt as the difference of two stationary variables 
is by definition itself stationary), which implies two new cointegrating 
vectors, namely, the new variables themselves. Now, a monetary policy 
tightening is characterised as a decrease in money growth, increasing 
interest rates and a simultaneous exchange rate appreciation. As before, 
the model is estimated several times, with ( being substituted and 
the other variables held constant. Ten different combinations of A,y( are 
possible, all of which are in turn included in a VAR. The combinations 
are:
bc4 t — ^c 5.1 ^c 3.t — bc5,t
— 6c4,(
bc2,t -  bc$tt bci.t -  bc5,t
bc2.t -  bc4]t bc\,t -  bc4,t
bco.t ~  bC3 t ben ~  bc3it
bci.t —  bc2.t




























































































The results of this exercise are reported in figure 6 in the appendix. 
The findings are striking. A tightening of monetary policy leads to sig­
nificant distributional effects. The business conditions of all size classes 
worsen (see above), but those of smaller size classes deteriorate signifi­
cantly more. The point estimates of responses of A,y( are negative for 
every single measure. In most cases, these responses are also signifi­
cantly negative. This in itself is evidence that small firms are hit harder 
by monetary policy tightenings than large firms.
Additionally, the impulse responses evolve monotonically across size 
classes. Firms become more heterogeneous when moving from the left 
to the right in the matrix of responses, as well as when moving up from 
the bottom. In both directions, and for every single row and column, the 
impulse responses become more pronounced step by step.
Checking the significance of the point estimates it seems that, ac­
tually, the firms are divided into three subgroups: the largest firms are 
significantly different from all the other size classes (as shown by the re­
sponses in the first row of figure 6); so are the smallest firms (as portrayed 
by the last column in figure 6). Firms of size classes two, three and four 
seem relatively homogeneous amongst themselves, and show significant 
differences only relative to firms of size classes one and five.14
How can the evidence on firm asymmetries be interpreted? Caution 
is warranted because the data set analysed here is of a very particular 
nature. It has to be kept in mind that firms only report whether condi­
tions have improved, worsened or stayed unchanged. Hence a stronger 
effect of interest rate shocks on the aggregated business condition series 
does not give evidence about how strongly one single firm is affected - 
the results merely indicate how many firms of a certain size class suffer 
from a worsening of business conditions. However, this is nonetheless
14One possible interpretation might be that the credit channel mainly affects firms 
of size classes 1 to 4, with size class 5 being relatively unaffected because of better 
access to commercial paper and other forms of external, unintermediated finance, and 
that the balance sheet channel is mainly significant for firms of size class 1, i.e. very 
small firms with very little collateral. These hypotheses cannot be tested for with the 




























































































informative about firm size effects of monetary policy. A significantly 
higher number of small firms faces deteriorated business conditions when 
compared to large firms after an increase in interest rates.
3.4 Exchange Rate Effects on Business Conditions
The extended VAR model allows me to investigate the responses of rel­
ative business conditions to an exchange rate shock. Figure 7 in the 
appendix provides the corresponding impulse responses, where the shock 
is one of an exchange rate depreciation. Large firms are generally be­
lieved to be more export-oriented than small firms, and as such should 
react more strongly to exchange rate changes. Following the exchange- 
rate depreciation, the business conditions of all firms improve, but those 
of large firms do so significantly more than those of small firms (which 
is reflected in a significantly negative response of most A^^e-variables). 
In four cases (3 vs. 5, 3 vs. 4, 2 vs. 4 and 1 vs. 4) a fairly quick re­
action is found which is at odds with a priori beliefs, but in two out of 
these cases, this unexpected reaction is reversed after some time. Over­
all, the picture that emerges confirms that large firms are more sensitive 
to exchange-rate changes.15
4 Demand Side Effects
The original hypothesis that small firms are affected more strongly by 
monetary policy shocks stems from capital market imperfection theories 
and as such is concerned with financial factors. The evidence found in the 
preceding section supports this hypothesis, but cannot reveal whether the 
asymmetry indeed arises due to financial factors. If the business survey 
included questions on the financial situation of firms, the hypothesis could 
be tested directly. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Another question 
contained in the survey, namely, on the current demand situation of firms,
15This is opposed to Guiso et al. (1999: 71), who find for Italy that size is not a 




























































































can be helpful to single out other potential explanations, however. This 
will be done in the remainder of this section.
Potentially, both the supply side as well as the demand side situa­
tion of firms should enter the evaluation of current business conditions. 
The business conditions of size class i can thus be described as a weighted 
sum of the two factors (possibly with some intercept a, and some error 
term e! ( ):
bcu  =  a* +  bJiderrii t +  (1 -  uii)supl[t +  £,,t
The constraints imposed by the data set are that supi]t is not ob­
servable - whereas demi t is. Additionally, we do not know the weights 
uil. It is easy to see, however, that regardless of the weighting, responses 
of bcl t to monetary policy shocks that exceed those of the responses of 
demi t must stem from supply side factors (note that 0 < cj, < 1). I 
will make use of this property as follows: the last model is extended to 
include the relative demand positions. The impulse responses of relative 
business conditions and demand situations are then compared: if the 
former arc bigger than the latter, it can be concluded that supply-side 
issues create asymmetry, too.
Unfortunately, this does still not identify financial factors as unique 
driving force; other explanations can be imagined, e.g., lower import 
prices following a monetary tightening and the accompanying exchange 
rate appreciation might benefit larger firms more than smaller ones, if 
they have a higher share of imported goods as inputs. In any case, the 
evidence has to remain indirect: with no question on financial factors in 
the business survey, the detection of supply-side effects is as far as the 
analysis can go.
A model specification with a demand variable is useful for another 
reason, too. Sometimes the ifo survey data have been criticised for a bias 
towards the demand side. A survey conducted by the ifo-Institute in 1976 
found that the people in charge of answering the business survey are very 
often in their regular business dealing with the firm's sales, and thus give 




























































































of this paper, are therefore somewhat underrepresented. By including a 
demand variable in the VAR, it is possible to check whether last section’s 
findings are robust. Once demand asymmetries across size classes have 
been accounted for, any asymmetries on top of this make a very strong 
case for supply-side and probably financial factors.
To check whether the demand variable itself responds as expected 
to a monetary policy shock, impulse responses are first calculated for the 
baseline VAR X t — [Dmt demit it 7T(]', using the KPSW procedure. 
derriij denotes demand and is varied to cover all five size classes. The 
results of the cointegration analysis and the tests on the restrictions on 
the cointegrating vectors can be found in the appendix. A cointegration 
rank of r — 3 is maintained for all models, with the cointegrating vectors 
being the demand variable, the real interest rate and superneutrality 
of money (see tables 6 and 7). Figure 8 plots the impulse responses 
of this briseline VAR. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock 
demand declines for firms of all size classes, as expected. Interestingly, 
the significance of this decline is less pronounced for larger firms, whereas 
its size is more or less equal across size classes.
In order to test for asymmetric effects, the relative demand situation 
is included in the model of 3.3. The VAR now comprises 
X t — A ij}t Dexrt Dmt ipt it nt}', where X x] Dt denotes
the relative demand position of firms, in contrast to Xj,t which rep­
resents the relative business conditions of firms. The model is again 
estimated for all ten possible combinations of the delta-variables. The 
corresponding impulse responses can be found in figures 9 and 10. The 
relative demand position of firms deteriorates significantly after a mon­
etary policy tightening, which means that again there is a bias which is 
unfavourable for small firms. Again, each point estimate becomes more 
pronounced moving up the columns or moving to the right in the rows 
of figure 9.16
16This could be explained by subcontracting. If large firms have small firms as 
their subcontractors, then the burden of declining demand would be spread unevenly: 
large firms would rather keep their workforce fully employed and cut down on the 




























































































How does the picture on the relative positions of firms with respect 
to their business conditions change? Comparing figure 9 with figure 10, 
it turns out that, indeed, the responses of relative business conditions 
are much stronger than those of demand positions. Interestingly, the 
responses of relative business conditions hardly change when the model 
is extended: figures 6 and 10 are nearly identical. The conclusion from 
this exercise is that demand also reacts more strongly for small firms; 
however, demand tells only part of the story. We are left with another 
cause of asymmetry that must stem from the supply side.
5 Business Cycle Asymmetry
As stated in the introduction, theories of the credit channel maintain 
the hypothesis that the distributional effects of monetary policy actions 
should be more pronounced if the economy is in a business cycle down­
turn. In the following, I will test for these effects, but two caveats should 
be mentioned beforehand.
Firstly, the data sample ranges from 1981:7 to 1998:12 and inspec­
tion of figure 1 reveals that over this sample period the German economy 
was going through roughly 1.5 cycles. The evidence to be extracted from 
this small sample has to be taken with caution.
Secondly, the German economy is often referred to as a bank-based 
system. Small firms in particular very often have a close link to one bank, 
their "Hausbank” . Theory suggests that small firms allow one single bank 
to gain such an influential position only because they expect advantages 
in other areas. For example, one of the possible gains a small firm might 
achieve in a close banking relationship is interest rate smoothing: a bank 
might be willing not to pass on a monetary-policy-induced interest rate 
increase to a close customer. This effect is probably strongest in times 
when the borrower would have difficulties with rising interest rates, i.e., 
in periods of low growth. Relationship lending can thus weaken the




























































































incidence of business cycle asymmetries to quite some extent.17
5.1 Estimation Strategy: Conditional Impulse Re­
sponses in a Markov-Switching Model
A new estimation approach will be employed to test for such business- 
cycle-related asymmetries: conditional impulse responses in a Markov- 
switching model.18 The procedure consists of two stages.
In the first stage, an unrestricted VAR is estimated that allows 
for Markov-switching parameters. Since the hypotheses to be tested are 
conditional on the business cycle, it is essential that the Markov-switching 
regimes should capture the states of the business cycle, i.e., the regimes 
must be business cycle expansions and contractions, respectively. This 
first stage yields distinct parameter sets: one describes the economy in 
a business cycle expansion, the other set is valid if the economy is in a 
contractionary business cycle phase.
These two sets of parameters are then used in a second stage where 
a structure is imposed by applying the usual identification restrictions, 
for each regime separately, and impulse response analysis is performed. 
The resulting impulse responses are conditional on the state of the econ­
omy, and as such disentangle the effects of monetary policy shocks for 
expansionary and contractionary business cycle phases.
The Markov-switching model employed in the first stage was orig­
inally introduced by Hamilton (1989). To achieve distinctly shaped im­
pulse responses for the two regimes, it is however necessary to extend 
his specification beyond a mere mean-switching model. State-dependent 
autoregressive parameters will give rise to different shapes of the im­
pulse responses, whereas a state-dependent variance-covariance matrix 
will lead to distinct impact effects of the shocks.
11 The evidence for this effect is limited to date: for an overview see Mojon (1999).
lsSee Ehrmann, Ellison and Valla (2000) for a more detailed exposition of the 




























































































It should be noted, however, that each additional parameter which 
is allowed to switch increases the computational burden of the algorithm, 
such that a parsimonious model is called for.19
Some more characteristics of this approach need mentioning here. 
Impulse responses conditional on the state of the economy, i.e., whether 
the economy is in a low or high growth state, are of course a ceteris 
panbus experiment. The economy is in a given regime when the mone­
tary policy shock hits the system, and the effects traced by looking at 
impulse responses assume that, throughout, the economy does not switch 
regimes.20 It is in this way possible to test the theoretical predictions, 
which themselves are conditional: the transmission channels are claimed 
to be stronger during downturns than during expansions.
Another word of caution is warranted here - the analysis is a pure 
thought experiment. Given a probability of staying in one regime of, say, 
.95, the expected probability of still being in the same regime some 48 
months later is merely .09 - so one would not really expect to stay in the 
same regime all the time for which the impulse responses are actually 
being calculated. The impulse responses are nonetheless a useful tool. 
As long as the economy stays in the same regime, they are valid - so even 
if the full trajectory is not being realised, the periods up to the change 
in regime are characterised by the conditional impulse responses.
5.2 Model Set-up
To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, the number of regimes 
chosen is two. In addition, the number of variables in the VAR is reduced. 
It is not feasible in this context to estimate large-dimensional systems as
19It tinned out to be infeasible to estimate a model with mean-switching, as in 
Hamilton (1989). I consider the intercept-switching model as described in Krolzig 
(1997) to be a relatively good approximation, however.
20This excludes any analysis of how effective such a monetary policy shock can be 
in moving the economy from one state to the other. Whether a monetary loosening in 
a low growth period increases the probability that the economy switches to a higher 




























































































in the preceding sections. The reduction is carried out in two steps. 
Firstly, it turns out that a cointegrated VAR with X t =  [bcl]t it 7rt]' 
with the KPSW identification scheme gives reasonable impulse responses, 
too: business conditions deteriorate after a shock to the interest rate and 
inflation falls. The informational content has decreased of course, because 
now it is no longer possible to disentangle liquidity and exchange-rate 
effects of monetary policy impulses.
A second reduction is possible because in the very special case anal­
ysed here, where the variables of interest are stationary, the model spec­
ification can be reduced from a full-blown VECM with KPSW's identifi­
cation scheme to a simple VAR with stationary variables only, where the 
identification scheme imposed follows a Choleski decomposition. The two 
models simulate the same shocks in this case: A KPSW model simulates 
shocks to the cointegration relations
and then calculates the response of the levels of each variable. The 
monetary policy shock is thus a shock to the second cointegrating vector, 
i.e., a shock to the real interest rate. An equivalent shock can be modelled 
in a VAR which includes 6cj,( and the real interest rate rt directly. In 
doing so, some information is lost, however, namely, the separate response 
of nominal interest rates and inflation, which, in the VAR, is aggregated 
to the response of real interest rates.
Both in KPSW with two cointegration relations and in the sta­
tionary VAR, one identification restriction has to be imposed. The re­
striction that a monetary policy shock cannot affect business conditions 
contemporaneously is imposed in a VAR with a Choleski decomposition 
by ordering real interest rates last.
The business conditions of firms define the business cycle; if they 




























































































sition is expansionary.21 If each model was estimated by introducing the 
business conditions of a certain size class, the definition of the business 
cycle would vary considerably across the estimates. To ensure some sta­
bility, each model therefore includes the business conditions of the largest 
firms and additionally those of firms of a different size class, thus leading 
to the model set-up
/  6c,.( \ /  Pi(st) \ /  bCi't-i \ (  bci<t- 2 \ /  £U
I bcs.t J =  I 0 2 (st) ) +B\(st) I 6c5.(_ i J +B 2(st) I 6c5,t_2 J +  J £ 2 1
\  n  /  \  03{st) )  \  r t_ !  /  \  r t_2 )  \  £31
( 1 )
where et ^  iid N (0, E). It is furthermore assumed that the state 
transition probabilities follow a first-order Markov chain:
2
Pa =  Pr(s(+i =j\s, =  i), Y I ph =  1 e (2)
2=1
Note that the variance-covariance matrix is not state-dependent. The 
impact effects of shocks are therefore identical across regimes. This is no 
limitation in the application here, because the monetary policy shock has 
a zero impact effect on the other two variables in the system - and the 
shock to the interest rate itself will be normalised to one for comparability 
reasons anyway.
Finally, some restrictions are imposed to decrease the number of 
switching parameters even further: none of the autoregressive parameters 
in the interest rate equation is switching, given that my focus is on the 
impulse responses of the other two variables. The restrictions imposed 
are
fh.3i(s =  1) =  b\3\{s — 2) 
b\. 33(s =  1) =  61.33(5 =  2) 
62.32(5 =  1) =  62.32(5 =  2)
61,32(5 =  1) =  b\ 32(s =  2) 
62.31(5 =  1) =  62.31(5 =  2) 
62.33(5 =  1) =  62.33 (5 =  2)
21This is in line with the XBER’s definition: "Contractions (recessions) start at the 





























































































In such a set-up, it is a priori not sure whether the regimes picked by 
the algorithm are actually related to the business cycle. Any kind of 
regime that shows best fit, be it characterised by distinct intercepts, au­
toregressive parameters, or some combination, can emerge. Nonetheless, 
the regimes picked were indeed characterised as business cycle downturns 
and expansions. To take an example, in the model with bc2 ,t and bc5t 
the estimated mean for bcro l is —.23 in regime one, and .09 in regime two 
(—.21 and .04 for bc2 ,t). Figure 11 in the appendix reports the accord­
ing regime probabilities and compares them with the business conditions 
variable 6c5 (. The fit of regimes to expansions and contractions is rela­
tively close: regime one spans from peaks to troughs and is therefore one 
of a business cycle contraction, whilst regime two is well characterised as 
an economic expansion. The characterisation of business cycle regimes is 
very close to those found in other, univariate Markov-switching models, 
e.g., Krolzig and Toro (1999). The matrix of switching probabilities is
/  0.92 0.08 \
~  \ 0.04 0.96 )
Two lags prove to be sufficient to achieve a well-specified VAR. This 
shows that the fit of the models is much better in a Markov-switching 
framework than when neglecting it; in the standard VAR models, a lag 
length of six was needed. The results of mis-specification tests22 can be 
found in the appendix. The restrictions imposed on the autoregressive 
parameters of the interest rate equation are accepted with a p-level of 
0.65.
In the second stage of the procedure, structure is given to the unre­
stricted MS-VAR. Figure 12 graphs the impulse responses to a monetary 
policy shock conditional on the state of the economy. In both regimes, a 
tightening of monetary policy leads to a deterioration of business condi­
tions for firms of all size classes. The interesting feature of figure 12 is the




























































































difference in policy transmission for the two different regimes. For some 
size classes, it is not very clear whether there is any difference, whereas 
there is a very clear cut answer for firms of size class one: the smallest 
firms face a much stronger deterioration of business conditions when the 
economy is in a downturn. The magnitude of the maximal effects more 
than doubles: from -3.5 to -7.7. A direct comparison across size classes 
is provided in the following table which demonstrates the amplification 
of responses in contractions relative to expansions (in the example of size 
class one: =  2.2).
Size Class 1 2 3 4 5
Amplification factor 2.2 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.0
The evidence on the asymmetries over the business cycle is clear: 
in a downturn, the effect of an interest rate shock on business condi­
tions is much stronger for the smallest firms, thus leading to more severe 
distributional effects, as is predicted by theory.
6 Expectation Formation
The ifo business survey includes a question on the expectations of firms 
about business conditions for the next six months. In this section, I 
will investigate whether firms are actually aware of the interest rate and 
exchange rate sensitivity of their business conditions. In this case, the 
contemporaneous interest rate and exchange rate should be significant 
explanatory variables for business expectations; interest rates should en­
ter with a negative sign, exchange rates with a positive sign.
No further use of impulse response analysis will be made to test 
this hypothesis. Expectations should ideally incorporate all the avail­
able information instantaneously; the impulse response should hence only 





























































































In order to identify the regressors properly, the information set of 
firms at the point in time when the expectations are formed must be 
determined. The questionnaires are sent out at the end of each month, 
with the bulk of the answers arriving at the ifo-Institute in the first 
week of the following month. That is, the expectations variable dated in 
period t does already include all the information available at the end of 
period t. The interest rate and the exchange rate should therefore enter 
any regression contemporaneously. The case of inflation is different. The 
figures for period t are normally published by the Statistisches Bundesamt 
in the second week of period t + 1; by then, the questionnaires arc already 
filled in and sent back. Therefore inflation enters the regression with 
one lag. The same is true for money growth. The earliest publication 
from which monetary developments can be inferred is the Bundesbank’s 
analytical accounts. They are published mid month for the preceding 
month. Hence money growth, too, enters the information set of firms 
with at least one lag, which has to be reflected in the model specification.
The estimations are performed in the form of univariate error cor­
rection models using the two-step estimator proposed by Engle and Granger 
(1987). The first specification includes contemporaneously a firms busi­
ness conditions, the interest rate, the exchange rate and lagged inflation 
and money growth as explanatory variables for firm's expectations. It 
turns out that money growth and inflation are insignificant, hence they 
are dropped in the subsequent estimates (see table 9 in the appendix 
for the significance tests). With this new specification, the cointegration 
test is passed for all firm size classes (results of the cointegration tests 





























































































Size Class 1: Expt -1.206ci,(
(0.07)














+ 2 .19i£ 
(0.42)
Size Class 4: Expt — .736c4.( 
(0.06)




Size Class 5: Expt — 556c5i( 
(0.07)




where the number in brackets are standard errors. The interest rate 
always enters with the correct sign, but the parameter estimates do not 
significantly decrease with increasing firm size. Small firms seemingly do 
not take their stronger interest rate sensitivity into account when they 
form expectations about their future business conditions.23
On the other hand, the parameters on the exchange rate are as 
expected. They all have the correct sign, and large firms do indeed 
attribute a larger weight to the exchange rate when thinking about the 
future development of their business conditions.
A second test along the same lines can be conducted with the ad­
justment coefficients a in the error correction models
p
AExpt =  v +  aECTt î +  ^  BtA X (_, +  ut
i=l
ECTt \̂ denotes the error correction term, and the vector A'( com­
prises all explanatory variables, in this case X t — [Expt bci t Dexrt it\' 
The lag length p was chosen to equal six (see table 11 in the appendix 
for mis-specification tests). Once the expectations are out of equilibrium
■3The interpretation can also go the other way round, however: it is just as possible 





























































































with the macroeconomic conditions, the speed of adjustment (measured 
by the a-coefficients) varies across size classes: small firms have the high­
est q , and as such get their expectations back to equilibrium the fastest.24 
The relationship is not monotonic, however, which is in line with the 
earlier findings. Small firms are hit relatively hard by monetary policy 
shocks, whereas large firms are affected relatively strongly by exchange- 
rate movements. It could be expected that those firms, which are the 
most sensitive to macroeconomic fundamentals, adjust their expectations 
the fastest. As a matter of fact, the estimated adjustment coefficients 
increase again for firms of size class 5. In detail, the estimates of a for 
the different models (with standard errors in brackets) are
Size Class 1 Size Class 2 Size Class 3 Size Class 4 Size Class 5
a -.17 (.06) -.14 (.05) -.08 (.05) -.09 (.05) -.12 (.05)
The exposure to economic fundamentals like interest rate and ex­
change rate developments determines the speed of adjustment: the small­
est and largest firms show a higher adjustment coefficient in the equilib­
rium correction.
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided empirical tests for hypotheses formulated in 
capital market imperfection theories, claiming a higher exposure of small 
firms to monetary policy tightenings when compared to large firms. The 
data set analysed consists of firms' aggregated answers from a business 
survey. The data is split into a wide range of size classes, spanning firms 
with 1-49 employees to firms with more than 1,000 employees. In this 
way, a sample bias towards large firms which is present in many data sets
24This is not a test of whether firms form rational expectations. Modesto (1989) 
has shown that such a test cannot be performed with aggregated business survey data: 
even if all firms are rational, the aggregated series can show autoregressive properties 




























































































is avoided. The business survey is conducted on a monthly basis, which 
allows for an analysis at a much higher frequency than the usual data sets 
on small firms (mostly annual balance sheet data or quarterly financial 
reports). The downside of the data set is possible ambiguities, because 
the survey questions concern non-quantifiable items such as the general 
assessment of business conditions. It has been shown, however, that the 
series possess good leading indicator qualities and correlate closely with 
the business cycle components of industrial production. Therefore, the 
data quality can be considered as adequate for research on macroeco­
nomic issues.
The empirical results strongly favour theories of asymmetric mon­
etary policy effects. The business conditions of all firms deteriorate after 
a monetary tightening, but those of small firms do so much more. As 
a consequence, small firms are relatively worse off after interest rate in­
creases; this shift in their relative position causes distributional effects 
of monetary policy in that the burden of adjustments is unevenly shared 
between firms of different size. It has furthermore been shown that these 
asymmetries are augmented in business cycle downturns. Compared to 
expansions, the distributional effects arc more pronounced.
The paper has also tried to disentangle the monetary policy ef­
fects. A tightening of monetary policy is transmitted via several chan­
nels. Whereas small firms are affected disproportionately by the balance 
sheet and credit channel, large firms suffer more from the consequent 
exchange-rate appreciation. An analysis of demand-side factors has been 
performed in order to distinguish supply-side from demand-side effects. 
Demand seems to act as a discriminating device, too. However, even after 
accounting for differences in the responses of relative demand situations 
of small vs. large firms there is still a significant distributional effect 
of monetary policy in the data. Demand-side factors can thus tell only 
part of the story, with the bulk being left for supply-side factors. Even 
though it was not possible to test the importance of financial issues with 
the available data, this is the main criterion that comes to mind when 
thinking about uneven effects of interest rate changes. The empirical 




























































































asymmetric effects of monetary policy, and cannot reject theories that 
attribute such effects to financial factors.
Finally, some explorations of the expectations formation of firms 
have been performed. It is found that the importance of interest rates 
for business conditions is not always fully recognised, but firms which 
are more exposed to monetary policy shocks show a higher speed of ad­
justment in equilibrium corrections. On the other hand, the role of the 
exchange rate seems to be perceived properly by firms both in expecta­
tions formation and in the speed of adjustment.
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A Appendix
A .l Transformation of Business Survey Data for 
the Empirical Analysis
The transformation applied to the business survey data series is based on 
the assumption that the data follows a logistic model. Most of the time, 
it can be expected that the variables cluster around medium values in 
the range, say, [—.5, .5]. Only if the macroeconomic conditions become 
very (un-) favourable can it be expected that the series come close to their 
extreme values of ±1. In order to make 100% of all firms answer that 
times arc worse/better, the conditions must be very severe, especially 
because the data are not disaggregated according to industry. Indeed, 




























































































This means, however, that the trajectories of the business survey series 
follow the model
where the xt are the usual explanatory variables of a regression 
model. The multiplication by the factor 2 and the subtraction of 1 ensure 
that the data actually lie in the range [—1,1] (for x't/3 + et —> oo, yt —► 1; 
for x't0  +  £t —* —oo, yt —> —1). Graphically, the model assumed for the 
business survey data looks as follows:





Let n( =  ex'^+e‘ . Thus (3) simplifies to
Vt =
Vt +  Vta t — 2 f l f  —  1 —  a (




























































































By applying the transformation xft =  In ^ y ^ -jit  is possible to es­ 
timate a linear regression model
A .2 The KPSW-Approach to Identification in Struc­
tural Vector Autoregressions
Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) go back to the seminal article 
by Sims (1980). They assume that the economy can be described by a 
dynamic, stochastic, linear model of the form:
with /j( ~  iid 7V(0,E/J), where X t represents an n:r 1-vector of 
endogenous variables, including one or several instrument variables, and 
L denotes the lag operator. The estimation proceeds with the reduced 
form
with Ci = Aq1A{ and st — Aq1̂ .  Estimates can be found for the 
coefficient matrices Ci and the variance-covariance matrix of the distur­
bances £(, Ee. However, of interest are the parameters in the matrices A, 
and E(1, which are exactly identified if n2 parameters are restricted. A 
first set of restrictions is found by the assumption of uncorrelated struc­
tural errors (i.e., E(I diagonal) and by normalising the diagonal elements 
to unity, yielding E,, =  which imposes n(n +  l ) /2  restric­
tions. Hence, further n(n — l) /2  restrictions are needed. Sims (1980) 
used a recursive structure to achieve identification, whereas subsequent 
contributions extended the range of identification schemes by restricting 
parameters in various matrices of the system. Amongst these are KPSW
V’t =  x'tP +  £( (4)
AqA j — A iX t_i +  ... +  AkXt-k +  Ht — A(L)Xt-1 +  Ht




























































































(1991). They have shown that cointegration properties of the data can 
be used for identification purposes. A cointegrated VAR model, which is 
in its Vector Error Correction format (Johansen 1995: 45-49):
/t-i
A X ( =  q /3  X ( _ i  4 -  ^  r , A X ( _ i  +  £ t  ( 7 )
1=1
has the Granger representation
i
A', = C j2 z >  +  C'(L)et + A (8)
t  =  l
where A depends on initial values, 0'A — 0, and C =  0±(aLr0±_)~la'±
E k—\
T,. Equation (8) shows that the representation 
in levels is composed of two parts, the non-stationary common trends 
Q'i EL, Si and the stationary part of C"(L)st.
The idea behind KPSW is to decompose the shocks e into r shocks 
that have only transitory effects (on the levels of the variables), and n — r 
shocks with permanent effects (with r denoting the number of cointegra­
tion relations). This is achieved by rotating the system by premultiplying 
certain matrices. The new set of variables Y is
The matrix S has to satisfy SC ^  0. It follows that the new set 
of variables consists of n — r non-stationary and r stationary variables. 
The stationary variables are identical to the cointegrating vectors; their 
stationarity follows because 0'C  =  0 and 0'A =  0:





























































































This system need not be identified fully; partial identification of ei­
ther the transitory or the persistent shocks is also possible. This amounts 
to the imposition of r(n — r) identification restrictions by setting the ac­
cording covariances of the shocks to zero. These restrictions have been 
tested for by the test for the cointegrating rank. Instead, however, a 
different kind of identification restriction is needed, namely a decision in 
which part of the system the supposed shock is to be found (like in the 
context of the present paper, where the monetary policy shock is identi­
fied in the transitory subsystem). This restriction cannot be tested and 
has to be justified by economic theory.
To identify the subsystems, additional untested identification re­
strictions are necessary. If only the shocks with permanent effects are of 
interest, then (n — r)(n — r — l ) /2  additional identification restrictions 
are needed. In particular, where there are r =  n — 1 cointegration rela­
tions, no additional identification restrictions have to be imposed. Should 
the shocks of interest be the transitory ones, then r(r — l) /2  additional 
restrictions are sufficient.




























































































-6 -5 ■4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
bel -.69 -.66 -.52 -.26 .08 .42 .67 . 7 8 .74 .60 .43 .27 .15
b c 2 -.46 -.30 -.08 .20 .48 .70 .83 . 8 5 .76 .61 .43 .24 .08
bc3 -.51 -.36 -.13 .15 .44 .68 .82 . 8 5 .78 .64 .47 .30 .16
bc4 -.56 -.42 -.19 .10 .41 .67 .82 . 8 5 .78 .64 .47 .30 .14
bc5 -.58 -.45 -.22 .08 .40 .67 .83 . 8 5 .76 .61 .43 .26 .11
expl -.57 -.61 -.55 -.38 -.12 .17 .42 .59 . 6 5 .60 .49 .36 .22
exp2 -.62 -.67 -.6 -.41 -.11 .22 .50 .67 . 7 0 .62 .49 .35 .23
exp3 -.62 -.68 -.63 -.44 -.15 .19 .48 .67 . 7 1 .64 .51 .37 .24
exp4 -.65 -.72 -.68 -.50 -.20 .16 .47 .66 .7 1 .64 .51 .35 .22
exp5 -.60 -.74 -.77 -.64 -.37 -.02 .32 .55 . 6 3 .57 .44 .31 .19
climi -.56 -.48 -.32 -.07 .22 .50 .70 . 7 9 .76 .65 .48 .31 .15
clim2 -.59 -.52 -.35 -.09 .22 .52 .73 . 8 2 .78 .66 .50 .33 .19
clim3 -.62 -.56 -.39 -.13 .19 .49 .72 . 8 2 .80 .68 .52 .35 .19
clim4 -.65 -.59 -.43 -.15 .18 .50 .73 . 8 3 .79 .66 .49 .31 .16
cliin5 -.69 -.66 -.52 -.26 ' .08 .42 .67 . 7 8 .74 .60 .43 .27 .15
Table 3: Cross-correlations with industrial production, quarterly 
bandpass-filtered variables
The numbers are correlations of the respective variables with indus­
trial output. For lag k, the correlations are defined between output; and 
variable;.*.. A positive k indicates hence the lead of a variable with respect 
to the business cycle. The variables are: business conditions (be) for firms of 
size class 1 to 5 ( 1 =smallest, 5=largest), business expectations (exp) and the 
i/o business climate index (dim).
M o d e l 'Pt bci.t beo ; bc3.t bcA.t best
r = 0" 88.87 90.16 88.01 94.68 91.64 96.06
r = lb 48.53 49.25 46.29 48.66 46.86 54.50
V = 2C 17.78* 21.17 20.19 22.92 21.13 25.37
r = 3'' 5.02* 4.27* 4.66* 4.60* 5.65* 4.75*
ical vvines: 95%: 47.21: 99%: 53.91; h 95%: 29.38; 99%: 34.87; c




























































































Table 4: Trace Statistics for the Test of Cointegration Rank of the 
baseline model: Dmt, it, 7rt and a business cycle variable
Model ipt bchl bc2,t bc3,t 6c4( bc5,t
X2(3) 9.10 6.83 5.97 4.82 3.94 6.17
p-value p.p3 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.10
Table 5: Test for three cointegrating vectors: ipt or bct2, real interest 
rates and superneutrality of money; baseline model: Dmt, it, irt and a 
business cycle variable
Model demit dem2.t dem3t dem4,( dem^t
r =  0“ 82.84 83.55 89.81 87.04 81.69
r =  l 6 41.54 39.97 46.44 44.41 40.64
r =  2C 20.34 20.32 19.68* 20.12 19.68*
r =  3d 2.42** 3.06** 3.08** 3.81** 3.31**
“ critical values: 95%: 47.21; 99%: 53.91; b 95%: 29.38; 99%: 34.87; c 95%: 
15.34; 99%: 19.69; d 95%: 3.84; 99%: 6.64
Table 6: Trace Statistics for the Test of Cointegration Rank, baseline 
model with Dmt, it, rr( and varying demand variables
Model demit dem2]t demXt dCTTl̂ t dem^t
X2(3) 8.64 7.29 6.72 6.72 6.81
p- value 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08
Table 7: Test for three cointegrating vectors: demand, real interest 
rates and superneutrality of money; model with Dmt, it, nt and varying
demand variables
Autocorrelation ARCH Markov chain
Equation 1 1.20 (0.31) 0.02 (0.89) 1.41 (0.23)
Equation 2 2.09 (0.08) 3.22 (0.07) 0.03 (1.00)
Equation 3 0.37 (0.83) 1.50 (0.22) 3.03 (0.02)*




























































































Tests are for omitted autocorrelation, omitted ARCH and mis-specification 
of the Markovian dynamics. Numbers in brackets are p-values.
Table 8: Mis-specification tests for the MS-VAR model on business 
conditions: bc2 ,t,bci:l,rt
Size Class 1 Size Class 2 Size Class 3 Size Class 4 Size Class 5
X2(2) 6.04 (0.05) 4.95 (0.08) 6.19 (0.05) 3.12 (0.21) 4.32 (0.12)
Table 9: Joint test for significance of money growth and inflation in the 
expectation formation
Size Class 1 Size Class 2 Size Class 3 Size Class 4 Size Class 5
t-adf -4.65** -4.09** -3.28* -3.55** -3.11*
t-statistics from an augmented Dickey-Fuller test; Critical Values: 
5% = -2 .87 7  l% = -3 .467
Table 10: Cointegration analysis for the expectation-equations
Autoregression ARCH Normality \2
Size Class 1 
Size Class 2 
Size Class 3 
Size Class 4 
Size Class 5
0.49 (0.84) 1.35 (0.23) 3.87 (0.14) 1.12 (0.30) 
0.99 (0.44) 1.88 (0.08) 0.33 (0.85) 1.07 (0.38) 
0.65 (0.72) 0.92 (0.49) 1.07 (0.58) 0.94 (0.59) 
0.65 (0.71) 1.06 (0.39) 0.18 (0.91) 0.95 (0.57) 
0.98 (0.45) 0.82 (0.57) 0.35 (0.84) 1.14 (0.28)
Tests are for residual serial correlation, residual ARCH, non-normality and 
hetcroscedasticity. Numbers in brackets are p-values.





























































































Figure 1: Business conditions of firms of size class 1 (smallest) and 
5 (largest)
B u s in e ss  Expectations





































































































































































































Figure 4: Business expectations and industrial production, band­




























































































Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
Money Growth
Industrial Production




























































































Response of Relative Business Conditions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 6: Responses of the relative business conditions of firms
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Figure 7: Responses of the relative business conditions of firms




























































































Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on Demand
Money Growth Interest Rate Size Class 1
Size Class 2 Size Class 3 Size Class 4




























































































Response of Relative Demand Positions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 9: Responses of the relative demand positions of firms (A ij,Dt)




























































































Response of Relative Business Conditions to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 10: Responses of the relative business conditions of firms
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Business Conditions, State-Dependent Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
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